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Based on the existing literature, this paper argues that an increase in foreign presence can affect the 
leverage of domestic firms. We develop a simple theoretical model in which the presence of foreign firms leads 
to a productivity spillover effect to domestic firms. This spillover effect can be negative, positive or zero. The 
model is used to show that an increase in foreign presence increases (decreases) the level of debt, as well as the 
level of investment of domestic firms, if the productivity spillover effect is positive (negative). We apply the 
model to explore the link between foreign presence and leverage with firm-level panel data from China. The 
empirical estimation, using Instrumental Variable Tobit regression, reveals that, in overall terms, the impact of 
foreign presence on the leverage of domestic firms in China's manufacturing sector is negative. We find that the 
negative impact on the leverage of privately owned firms is large relative to state-owned firms. Furthermore, we 
find that the impact of foreign presence on leverage varies from industry to industry, which is consistent with 
the presence of heterogeneity in the productivity spillover effect. 
 
 







International business researchers, such as Dunning (1988), argue that foreign firms 
possess significant advantages over domestic firms and hence foreign direct investment (FDI) 
in a country can affect the output of domestic firms. FDI affects the output of domestic firms 
directly as well as indirectly through FDI-linked spillover effects. The entry of foreign firms 
increases competition in the domestic market which can affect the profitability of domestic 
firms. Increased competition can also restrict the growth opportunities of domestic firms.1 
Profitability and growth opportunities are important determinants of firm capital structure 
(Céspedes, González and Molina, 2010; Margaritis and Psillaki, 2010 and Kayo and Kimura, 
2011).2 Brander and Lewis (1986) made an important contribution to the related literature by 
demonstrating that the output and financial structure decisions of firms are interconnected. 
Recent studies, such as Campello (2006), have emprically evaluated the link between firm 
product market performance and financing decisions. Campello argues that debt financing 
does not always hurt a firm’s product market performance; moderate debt can contribute to 
an increase in market share. 
Given that (i) the output and financial structure decisions of firms are interconnected 
and (ii) firm output is affected by FDI, it can be argued that the presence of foreign firms in a 
country, through the related spillovers, can also affect firm capital structure. For example, 
due to an increase in foreign presence, domestic firms may shift to debt financing because 
raising equity is too difficult. In other words, based on the finance and international 
business/economics literature, there seems to be a clear link between the presence of foreign 
                                                 
1 A large number of studies including Görg and Greenaway (2004), Branstetter (2006), Buckley, Clegg and 
Wang (2007), Haskel, Pereira and Slaughter (2007), Liu (2008) and Meyer and Sinani (2009) support this view. 
 




firms and the capital structure of domestic firms. However, none of the existing studies has 
formally explored this link. 
This paper makes two distinct contributions to the existing literature. First, using a 
simple theoretical model, where firms aim to maximize their value and the presence of 
foreign firms gives rise to productivity spillovers to domestic firms, we show that the 
presence of foreign firms can also affect the capital structure of domestic firms. Second, 
using firm level panel data from China’s manufacturing sector, the link between foreign 
presence and the capital structure of domestic firms is empirically evaluated. Specifically, we 
show that an increase in foreign presence increases both the optimal debt level and 
investment of domestic firms, only if the productivity spillover effect is positive. However, in 
the presence of a negative productivity spillover effect, an increase in foreign presence 
decreases the optimal debt level as well as investment. Because foreign presence can increase 
(or decrease) both debt and investment, its impact on the leverage of domestic firms cannot 
be unambiguously determined. We explore this link by means of an empirical study. Based 
on the theoretical model, an empirical model is specified. The empirical model is estimated 
making use of firm level panel data over the period 2000-2007 from China. 
Our empirical work is focused on China because China is one of the largest recipients 
of FDI and the Chinese economy is rapidly growing. Since the opening up of the Chinese 
economy in the late 1970s, the Chinese capital market has gone through significant changes. 
As noted by Chen (2004), compared to most western firms, Chinese firms make greater use 
of retained earnings for business finance. Recent figures suggest a shift away from this in 
favor of equity finance and hence our empirical study is based on a relatively recent dataset. 
In 2011, 282 new companies listed on the stock market raising US$45.3 billion in new equity 
funds (which represents a sharp decrease as compared to US$76.3 billion raised in 2010 but a 
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big improvement over 2009 when only 99 companies were listed raising US$29.6 billion).3 
Private equity is emerging as an important source of funds for China’s small and medium-
sized companies (Perkowski, 2012). China’s economic landscape is rapidly changing. For 
example, China has recently allowed a number of foreign institutions to invest in its capital 
market. The new rules allow selected international fund managers to invest a combined total 
of US$80 billion in China. China has also decided to extend Chinese currency loans to some 
emerging nations. The success of this and related measures depends on strong banks. The 
Chinese banking system, with a cap on deposit rates, guarantees significant profits. Chinese 
banks are state-owned and a strong banking system cannot be established unless steps are 
taken to reduce the monopoly power of state-owned banks (Financial Times, 2012 & Pierson, 
2012). 
Chen (2004), Chen and Strange (2005), Huang and Song (2006), Qian, Tian and 
Wirjanto (2009), Li, Yue and Zhao (2000), among others, have considered the determinants 
of capital structure in China.4 However, none of these studies has considered the impact of 
the presence of foreign firms. The empirical analysis presented in this study is based on a 
comprehensive dataset that covers over 85 per cent of the total industrial output of China. 
Such an extensive dataset allows one to appropriately measure the presence of foreign firms. 
One of the reasons why the earlier studies have not empirically examined the impact of the 
presence of foreign firms on firm capital structure may be that the dataset available was not 
sufficiently large. Earlier studies on China have suggested that the financing decisions of 
private and state-owned firms can be very different. Accordingly, we also separately examine 
the impact of foreign presence on the capital structure of (a) privately owned and (b) state and 
                                                 
3 Keister (2004) suggests that economic transition in China forced a large number of Chinese firms to reduce 
their reliance on loans from state-owned banks. An (2012) argues that taxation can also affect firm capital 
structure. 
 
4 Li, Yue and Zhao (2009) show that state ownership has a positive effect on leverage and firm access to long-
term debt, whereas the impact of foreign ownership on leverage is negative. 
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collectively owned firms. As financing decisions may vary across Chinese industry sectors, 
this paper also separately considers the case of the (i) textile industry, (ii) transportation 
equipment manufacturing industry, (iii) electrical machinery and equipment manufacturing 
industry and (iv) communication equipment, computer and other electronic equipment 
manufacturing industry. The choice of these industries is mainly dictated by data availability. 
The empirical results are based on Tobit and Instrumental Variable Tobit estimations. Our 
empirical analysis suggests that foreign presence decreases the leverage of domestic firms in 
China’s manufacturing sector. We find that the negative impact on the leverage of privately 
owned firms is relatively large. Furthermore, the impact of foreign presence on the leverage 
of domestic firms varies from industry to industry.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  A theoretical model that shows the link 
between the presence of foreign firms and firm capital structure is presented in section 2. 
Based on the theoretical model, an empirical model is specified in Section 3. This section 
also includes a discussion of the data. The empirical results are presented in Section 4 and 
Section 5 contains some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Firm Leverage and Foreign Presence: A Theoretical Model 
By making use of a simple theoretical model that combines elements of finance 
theory and international business, the aim of this section is to establish a link between the 
presence of foreign firms and firm capital structure. 
Consider an industry where is the proportion of foreign firms. A representative 
domestic firm with wealth W  raises debt  D  to finance an investment I at time 0, which is 
used in production at time 1. As everything is measured in real values and the magnitude of 
investment depends on the size of debt, debt indirectly enters as an input into the production 
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process. ( )f I Ae I is the firm production function, where e captures the size of foreign 
presence and the resulting spillovers to domestic firms. Specifically, 0  means that there 
are no foreign firms in the industry and hence there is no productivity spillover effect, 
whereas 1   implies that all firms are foreign. As this paper focuses on the impact of foreign 
presence on the leverage of domestic firms and the dataset used in our empirical analysis 
contains a large number of foreign firms, we assume that 0 1.   In other words, there is 
foreign presence but not all firms in the industry are foreign. As discussed earlier, the 
presence of foreign firms leads to productivity spillovers to domestic firms. The parameter   
captures the sign of such spillovers. 0   implies the presence of positive spillovers, 
whereas 0  means that the presence of foreign firms does not generate any spillovers to 
domestic firms. 0   captures the idea of negative spillovers, where the presence of foreign 
firms reduces the productivity of domestic firms. In other words, the sign of   captures the 
heterogeneity of the impact of foreign presence on domestic firms located in different 
industries. The degree of this impact depends on a number of factors, including the distance 
to the world technology frontier. Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2006) and Aghion et al. 
(2009), among others, show that domestic firms in industries that are far away from the 
technological frontier are negatively affected by the entry of foreign firms, while firms in 
industries that are closer to the frontier enjoy positive productivity spillover effects. In our 
theoretical model, a positive value of   suggest that the presence of foreign firms is a source 
of positive externality (i.e., as the proportion of foreign firms increases, the domestic firms 
experience a higher level of positive externality). The positive externality arises from 
spillovers that result from, among other things, the introduction of new technology and 
superior management skills. The parameter A captures the impact of other factors that enter 
into (and affect) the production process, such as the level of domestic technology, etc.  
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At time 2, a random cash flow x is realized and the debt (D) is payable. The 
randomness of cash flow x is due to market uncertainty and x is uniformly distributed over 
the support  0, .a If the firm defaults, a deadweight cost of C is incurred. The firm’s problem 
is to choose the level of debt (D) and investment (I) to maximize its value, as follows: 




Ae I dx I D
a








I W dx dx
a a
   
     
   
   
By solving the above optimization problem5, the optimal level of debt can be derived 
as follows: 
                                  
 
1 1





   
    
  
                                             (1) 
Equation (1) shows that, irrespective of the value of  , there is a one-to-one and 
positive relationship between debt and the uncertain cash flow. In other words, as the 
maximum possible cash flow  i.e., a  increases, domestic firms are more likely to opt for a 
higher level of debt. Investment decisions are based on potential cash flows. As the maximum 
possible cash flow increases, investors would be more willing to take on extra debt. Equation 
(1) also shows that an increase in the debt default cost  i.e., C discourages debt since if β ≥ 
0, A > 1 and if β < 0, A > e-β. If the debt default cost is zero then the optimal debt equals the 






 is always greater 
than one, the optimal debt is positive only if .a C 6 In other words, the debt default cost 
cannot be greater than (or equal to) the maximum possible cash flow. 
                                                 
5 We assume that if β ≥ 0, A > 1 and if β < 0, A > e-β such that the second order sufficient condition holds. 
6 In other words, in the presence of a positive spillover effect, 1A  and a C are necessary conditions for the 
optimal debt to be positive.  
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Equation (1) can be used to establish a relationship between foreign presence and the 
optimal debt of a domestic firm as follows: 













   (2) 
Equation (2) shows the impact of an increase in foreign presence on the optimal debt 
of a domestic firm depends on the sign of productivity spillover effect  i.e.,  . An increase 
in foreign presence in the industry increases the optimal debt of a domestic firm only if 
productivity spillover effect is positive  i.e., 0  . Equation (2) also suggests that the debt 
default cost plays a crucial role. If the debt default cost was lower, foreign presence would 
lead to a smaller increase in optimal debt provided that 0  . A positive productivity 
spillover effect implies that an increase in foreign presence leads to an increase in the 
productivity of the domestic firms, which improves profitability. A large number of existing 
studies, such as Meyer and Sinani (2009), have confirmed the presence of such a positive 
productivity spillover effect. An increase in profitability also increases the firm’s capacity to 
take on extra debt. However, in the presence of a negative productivity spillover effect, an 
increase in foreign presence reduces the productivity of domestic firms which contributes to a 
decrease in their ability to take on debt. Finally, equation (2) suggests that in the absence of 
productivity spillover effect, an increase in foreign presence would have no effect on the 
optimal debt of domestic firms. 
We now turn our attention to the impact of foreign presence on investment of 
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a a
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  , the relationship 
between debt and investment can be written as follows: 







                                                 (3) 
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By differentiating equation (3) with respect to ,  the relationship between foreign 
presence and optimal investment can be derived as follows: 
              
 
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(4) 
Given that 1A   and 0   (namely the productivity spillover effect is positive), 
equation (4) suggests that an increase in foreign presence increases firm investment. 
However, in the presence of negative productivity spillovers, an increase in foreign presence 
decreases firm investment. Because, foreign presence increases (or decreases) both debt and 






is not immediately clear.  
The link between foreign presence and leverage of domestic firms can be further 
explored by re-writing equation (4) in terms of percentage change as 
 a C DI D D
I a D I
 
 
           
                    
 
The above expression is the elasticity of investment with respect to foreign presence. Using 
equation (1), the impact of a change in foreign presence on firm leverage in percentage terms 
can be written as  
                             
                          1
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                      (5) 
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Equation (5) shows that the impact of an increase in foreign presence on firm leverage 
depends on the debt default cost, maximum possible cash flow and other factors. From 
equation (5), we can characterize the impact of foreign presence on domestic firms’ leverage 
in the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: (a) If there exists no productivity spillovers from foreign investment 









); (b) If foreign investment positively affects domestic firms’ productivity 
(namely β > 0), it also positively affects domestic firms’ optimal leverage if firm productivity 








, if A > 2) 7; (c) If there exists negative productivity 
spillovers, the foreign investment negatively affects domestic firms’ optimal leverage, given 
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, where second 
inequality is obtained by applying the condition of a > C, and the third inequality is obtained 
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, where the third 
inequality is obtained by the fact that β < 0, 0 ≤ γ ≤1, and the term eβγ is a decreasing function 









Given Proposition 1, the next step is to estimate this relationship using data from a 
real economy. In this paper, we use firm level panel data from China to empirically evaluate 
the relationship between firm leverage and foreign presence.  
Using equations (1) and (3), the optimal value of firm leverage can be written as 
follows: 
   
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Equation (6) suggests that there is a relationship between foreign presence and firm 
leverage and this relationship is sensitive to fluctuations in factors that include the maximum 
cash flow and debt default cost. As all of these factors and the parameters of the production 
function cannot be observed in real life, we empirically evaluate the relationship between 
foreign presence and leverage by means of an empirical model.  
The theoretical results presented in the above are based on an analysis of a 
representative (or an average) firm. In the presence of positive FDI-linked spillover effects, 
Proposition 1 suggests that an increase in the presence of foreign investment leads to an 
increase in the optimal leverage if domestic firms are sufficiently productive. If domestic 
firms are not productive enough (namely A <2), the impact of foreign investment can be 
negative. In particular, an increase in foreign presence increases the productivity of domestic 
firms, which increases their profitability. An increase in profitability encourages other 
domestic firms to enter the industry, which increases the level of competition for debt and 
hence the impact on leverage can be negative if domestic firms themselves are not strong 
enough (i.e. less productive)8. As in equation (5),  the impact of a change in the level of 
foreign investment on the capital structure of domestic firms (depending on the size of 
foreign investment-linked spillover effects and its impact on profitability) can vary from 
industry to industry. Accordingly, the empirical analysis presented in this paper also 
considers the link between foreign presence and firm capital structure in different industries. 
                                                 
8 Meanwhile, increase in foreign presence also increases competition in the domestic market, which reduces 
firm profitability. A decrease in firm profitability can force some domestic firms to exit the industry, which 
reduces the demand for debt and hence the overall impact on firm leverage can also be positive. Our model does 
not explicitly capture this effect. 
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In order to empirically evaluate the impact of foreign presence on the leverage of 
domestic firms, using Taylor’s expansion, we linearize equation (6) at  0 0 0 0, , ,A C W  which 
yields equation (7) as follows: 9 
                 0 1 2 3 4leverage A C W                (7) 
where , , 
, , , and y denotes the functional form of 
equation (6). 
Based on equation (7), the following empirical model can be specified, where itfp is 
foreign presence in industry i  at time .t  
       0 1 2 3 4it it it i t itleverage X fp dindustry dyear                                    (8) 
Equation (8), which is based on equation (7), suggests that A, C, and W depend on a 
set of firm characteristics  X . As we plan to estimate the model by using firm level panel 
data, industry dummies (dindustry) and year dummies (dyear) have been included in equation 
(7). Finally, we also add an error term  it to capture the impact of all omitted variables. The 
error term is assumed to be i.i.d. normal. Equation (8), which is our empirical model, is 
further discussed in the following section. 
3. Empirical Model and Data 
                                                 
9 Since a number of existing studies, such as Liu (2008), have confirmed the presence of a positive spillover 
effect to domestic firms in China’s manufacturing sector, in order to focus on the impact of a change in foreign 
presence on leverage, we do not explicitly estimate β. 
 






































The theoretical model presented in Section 2 shows that firm capital structure depends 
on a number of factors including foreign presence. Equation (7) includes X  which is a vector 
of control variables. These control variables consist of other determinants of firm capital 
structure that have been identified in previous studies. These variables include firm size, firm 
age, collateral value of assets, growth opportunities, non-debt tax shields, profitability, 
business risk and ownership structure; dindustry is a set of two-digit industry dummies that 
control for industry fixed effects; dyear is a set of year dummies that captures the time variant 
effects. fp, which is the main variable of interest, captures the presence of foreign firms. The 
degree of foreign presence fp is the share of the assets of foreign firms within the four-digit 














where y is the firm’s total assets, F is the set of foreign firms in the industry whereas J is the 
set of all firms in the industry; F is a subset of J (i.e., ).F J 11 
In order to address the issue of omitted variable bias, eight variables are included in 
the vector of control variables. These variables are selected in an attempt to take into account 
the agency and other costs arising from asymmetric information faced by stakeholders (i.e., 
the debt holders, equity holders and firm managers).  
The first control variable is firm size, which is measured by the natural logarithm of 
number of employees. Firm size can also be measured by the natural logarithm of firm 
                                                 
10 A firm is designated as a foreign firm if it has foreign capital. Such firms are also characterized as foreign-
invested firms (see Meyers and Sinani, 2009 and references therein). In our sample, the share of foreign capital 
in more than 85% of the designated foreign firms is greater than 30 per cent. Furthermore, the proportion of 
foreign capital in over 75 per cent of the designated foreign firms is greater than 50 per cent. 
 




assets.12 Compared with smaller firms, large firms tend to diversify their business and 
therefore have a lower risk of default (Ferri and Jones, 1979; Rajan and Zingales, 1995), 
which suggests a positive relationship between firm size and leverage. A number of 
theoretical studies (Harris and Raviv, 1990; Narayanan, 1988; Noe, 1988; Poitevin, 1989; 
Stulz, 1990) have suggested that firm leverage increases with firm size. Empirical studies 
also tend to support this positive relationship, for example de Jong, Kabir and Nguyen 
(2008), Wu and Yue (2009) and Kayo and Kimura (2011). 
Firm age can also affect leverage. It has been suggested that older firms are likely to 
have lower debt-related agency costs (Frank and Goyal, 2009), which leads to a higher 
leverage ratio. Akhtar and Oliver (2009) report a positive relationship between firm age and 
leverage, indicating that the former effect outweighs the latter (i.e., information asymmetry) 
effect. 
Just like firm age, the collateral value of assets (the tangibility of assets) exerts two 
contrasting effects on firm leverage. Tangible assets can serve as collateral against external 
loans (Scott, 1977). An increase in tangible assets can reduce the scope of asset substitution 
(Bradley et al., 1984; Harris and Raviv, 1991; Titman and Wessels, 1988) and have a higher 
liquidation value than intangible assets in case of bankruptcy (Fattouh et al., 2008; Huang and 
Song, 2006). Accordingly, firms with higher tangible assets tend to have lower default costs 
and fewer debt-related agency problems (Akhtar and Oliver, 2009), which in turn suggests a 
positive relationship between tangible assets and leverage. Huang and Song (2006), Fattouh, 
Harris, and Scaramozzino (2008) and Akhtar and Oliver (2009) found a positive relationship 
between tangible assets and leverage. However, in the case of Chinese firms, Li, Yue and 
Zhao (2009) reported a negative relationship between the two variables. 
                                                 
12 Céspedes, González and Molina (2010) used logarithm of sales as a measure of size. 
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Growth opportunities represent non-collateralisable assets. Owing to the asset 
substitution effect, a firm faced with high growth opportunities may find it hard to access 
credit (Bradley et al., 1984; Titman and Wessels, 1988). Growth opportunities also affect 
firm leverage through changing the agency costs. This effect arises from the conflict of 
interest between debt and equity holders. Myers (1977) has suggested that firms with high 
growth opportunities also experience high agency cost. A high growth firm may not issue 
debt and thus have a low leverage ratio. In other words, the relationship between leverage and 
growth opportunities can be negative (see Berens and Cuny, 1995). A number of existing 
empirical studies have found a negative relationship between leverage and growth 
opportunities (for example see de Jong, Kabir and Nguyen, 2008, Akhtar and Oliver, 2009 
and Kayo and Kimura, 2001). However, Wu and Yue (2009) and Céspedes, González and 
Molina (2010) found a positive relationship between growth opportunities and leverage. 
Taxation is another factor that affects a firm’s choice of capital structure. DeAngelo 
and Masulis (1980) show that non-debt tax shields substitute for the tax benefits of holding 
higher debts and therefore a firm with higher non-debt tax shields tends to have lower 
leverage. This negative relationship is confirmed by a majority of empirical studies; for 
example, see Wald (1999) and Huang and Song (2006). Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984) 
found the relationship between non-debt tax shields and leverage to be positive. The 
empirical evidence provided by de Jong, Kabir and Nguyen (2008) is mixed; the relationship 
between the average tax rate and leverage is positive in the case of some countries and 
negative in the case of others. 
Firm profitability is expected to affect leverage, but existing theories provide 
contradictory predictions concerning the direction of the relationship (see Céspedes et al., 
2010).13 The pecking order theory (Myers, 1984) suggests that firms will first resort to 
                                                 
13 An excellent review of theories of capital structure can be found in Brounen, de Jong and Koedijk (2006). 
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internally generated funds for financing investment and hence more profitable firms tend to 
have a lower level of leverage. The tax-based models (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980; Leland, 
1994; Ross, 1977) suggest that highly profitable firms can borrow more to shield income 
from corporate taxes, which predicts a positive relation between profitability and leverage. 
Based on agency theories, it can be argued that debt can act as a disciplining device that 
restrains the manager’s behavior (Jensen, 1986; Williamson, 1988) and hence highly 
profitable firms should have more debt. On the other hand, treating the corporate capital 
structure as a mechanism to alleviate the problem associated with the separation of ownership 
from control, Chang (1999) shows that the optimal contract between the corporate insider and 
outside investors can be interpreted as a combination of debt and equity and highly profitable 
firms tend to have less debt. In contrast to these contradictory theoretical predictions, 
empirical studies appear to have found a consensus. Studies such as Fattouh, Harris, and 
Scaramozzino (2008), de Jong, Kabir and Nguyen (2008), Li, Yue and Zhao (2009) and Kayo 
and Kimura (2011) found a significant negative relationship between profitability and 
leverage.  
The existing literature has also suggested that business risk (or the volatility of 
earnings) can also affect capital structure. Generally speaking, it is expected that business risk 
negatively affects the level of leverage (Booth et al., 2001; Burgman, 1996; Chen et al., 1997; 
Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Titman and Wessels, 1988). 
The last variable included in the vector of control variables X is ownership; whether a 
firm is privately owned or state and collectively owned. Jensen and Meckling (1976) identify 
two types of conflicts of interest, namely the conflicts between shareholders and managers 
and those between shareholders and debtholders, and therefore the ownership structure is 
expected to affect the level of leverage. Zeckhauser and Pound (1990), Chen and Strange 
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(2005) and Huang and Song (2006), among others, found the relationship between ownership 
and leverage to be statistically significant.14 
3.1 The Data 
We utilize a comprehensive data set from China’s National Bureau of Statistics. This 
dataset accounts for over 85 per cent of China’s total industrial output from 2000 to 2007. 
Similar datasets from the same source have been used by a number of existing studies. For 
example Hu, Jefferson, and Qian (2005) have considered the issue of R&D and technology 
transfer; Jefferson, Thomas, and Zhang (2008) have considered productivity growth and Sun 
(2009) has considered the issue of export spillovers arising from FDI. We first clean the 
dataset by excluding firms that (1) employ fewer than eight workers as they may not have 
reliable accounting systems (Jefferson et al., 2008); (2) report negative net values of fixed 
assets, negative employee wages, negative long term debt, negative total equity, negative 
total assets, and negative annual depreciation; (3) report a long term debt to total assets ratio 
higher than 1.15 Our aim is to avoid extreme outliers. In 2002-03, the Chinese Government 
revised its industrial classification method. In order to remove this inconsistency from the 
original dataset, we applied the 2002-03 industrial classification to the data prior to 2003.   
Based on the cleaned dataset, we construct the dependent and explanatory variables. 
Following Doukas and Pantzalis (2003) and Mitto and Zhang (2008), the dependent variable, 
i.e., leverage, is computed as the ratio of long term debt to total debt and equity. Firm size is 
measured by the natural logarithm of the number of employees. Firm age is the number of 
years the firm has been operational. Following Friend and Lang (1988), the collateral value of 
                                                 
14 Margaritis and Psillaki (2010) have highlighted the importance of the links among capital structure, 
ownership structure and firm performance. Céspedes, González and Molina (2010) focused on the link between 
ownership structure and firm capital stucture in Latin America. Furthermore, the recent work of Paligorova and 
Xu (2012) on determinants of leevrage also highlights the importance of firm ownership strucuture. 
 
15 Debt to total assets can be greater than 1 if the book value of equity is negative. This occurs if the firm has 
had negative profits for a while. 
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assets is calculated as the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. Following, Fattouh et al. 
(2008), growth opportunities are measured by the annual percentage change in total assets. 
Non-debt tax shields are defined as the total annual depreciation scaled down by total assets 
(Bradley et al., 1984; Titman and Wessels, 1988). We measure profitability by the ratio of a 
firm’s total profits to its total assets, and its standard deviation in the four digit industries is 
used to proxy for business risk. Ownership is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a 
firm is privately owned. As indicated earlier, the presence of foreign firms is measured by the 
share of the assets of foreign firms in the four digit industry16.  
<insert Table 1 & 2 about here> 
  Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the entire sample. The correlation matrix 
for the entire sample is presented in Table 2. The estimated correlation coefficients among 
explanatory variables appear to be reasonably low. 
 
4. Empirical Results and Discussion 
In this section we present the estimation results. Since the dependent variable (i.e., 
leverage), is censored between 0 and 1, the Tobit regression method was used to estimate 
equation (7). The model was estimated by making use of pooled data over a period of eight 
years, clustered by firm to accommodate the problem of potential heteroskedasticity and 
unspecified serial correlation within firms. However, it is possible that foreign firms tend to 
enter an industry where firms have low leverage, or firms with low leverage are more likely 
to be acquired by the foreign firms. In both cases, the presence of foreign firms in equation 
(7) may be endogenous. To address the possible endogeneity issue, we employ the Tobit 
model with instrumental variables, using Newey's minimum chi-squared estimator with the 
                                                 
16 Note a firm is defined to be foreign owned if it receives foreign investment. According to this definition, in a 




one-year lagged presence of foreign firms and the number of firms in the four digit industries 
as the instruments.17  
The estimated results are reported in Table 3. In order to facilitate a comparison, 
estimated results from three estimation techniques are reported: (i) ordinary least square 
(OLS), (ii) Tobit and (iii) instrumental variables Tobit (IV-Tobit). Except for the estimated 
coefficient of foreign presence, the Tobit and the IV-Tobit estimation results are quite 
similar. However, as far as magnitude of the estimated coefficients is concerned, the OLS 
results are very different from the Tobit and IV-Tobit estimation. We tested the foreign 
presence variable for exogeneity. The estimated value of the Wald statistic for exogeneity is 
69.13 (with a p-value of 0.000). Based on the estimated p-value, it is possible to reject the null 
hypothesis of exogeneity with a very high degree of confidence. Accordingly, it can be 
argued that IV-Tobit estimation is more appropriate and the discussion presented below is 
based on the third estimation technique. 
The estimated coefficient of foreign presence reported in Table 3 is negative and 
highly significant suggesting that an increase in foreign presence reduces the leverage of 
domestic firms in China’s manufacturing sector, which could be attributed to increased 
competition for funds in the domestic market. Massive foreign investment in China has 
resulted in expansion of the private sector which has in overall terms increased the level of 
competition for loanable funds and hence there is a negative relationship between foreign 
presence and firm leverage.  
<insert Table 3 about here> 
                                                 
17 As indicated by, among others, Nowak-Lehmann, et al. (2012), in the presence of persistent autocorrelation, 
lagged variables do not always serve as good instruments. Given that this paper utilizes panel data from 2000 to 
2007, autocorrelation is not a serious concern. The statistical analysis found the instruments used in this paper to 
be valid. In addition, a number of sensitivity tests were conducted (see section 4.1 for further details). These 
tests suggest that the main empirical results presented in this paper are robust. 
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The signs and magnitudes of the coefficients of the rest of the determinants of capital 
structure are largely consistent with other studies. Firm size significantly and positively 
affects leverage, confirming that bigger firms tend to diversify their business which reduces 
the default risks and hence increases their leverage level (Ferri and Jones, 1979; Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995).18 Older firms are found to have higher leverage, indicating that the positive 
effect of lower debt-related agency costs (Frank and Goyal, 2009) outweighs the negative 
effect of a lower information asymmetry on the leverage level (Akhtar and Oliver, 2009). 
Ownership plays a significant role and privately owned firms have a lower leverage level 
than their state and collectively owned counterparts, which occurs due to the fact that the 
state and collectively owned firms have better access to credit (especially bank loans from the 
state-owned banks). The coefficient of the collateral value of assets is significantly negative, 
which implies that tangible assets act as credible collateral to reduce information asymmetries 
and therefore lower the leverage level; this follows from the fact that reduction in information 
asymmetries makes equity less costly (Akhtar and Oliver, 2009). Li, Yue and Zhao (2009) 
found the impact of ownership structure on leverage in China to be negative. Business risk 
appears not to significantly affect the leverage level, which is consistent with the work of de 
Jong, Kabir and Nguyen (2008) on China. The impact of profitability on leverage is negative, 
which supports the predictions of the pecking order theory and the agency theories that treat 
debt as a disciplining device. This result is also consistent with Li, Yue and Zhao (2009)’s 
work on China. The estimated results concerning the impact of growth opportunities and 
profitability are also consistent with de Jong, Kabir and Nguyen (2008) and Kayo and 
Kimura (2011).  The impact of non-debt tax shields and growth opportunities on the leverage 
level is statistically insignificant. 
                                                 
18 Chen (2004) argues that in the case of China, the long run relationship can also be negative.  
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The existing literature, such as the work of Chen (2004), suggests that debt is not 
freely available to all firms in China. Li, Yue and Zhao (2009) found that non state-owned 
firms tend to have lower debt as compared to state-owned firms. The empirical results 
presented in Table 3 also suggest that ownership structure has a significant impact on 
leverage. In order to further explore this issue, the sample was split into (i) state and 
collectively owned and (ii) privately owned domestic firms. The results of IV-Tobit 
estimation for each of these two groups are reported in Table 4. 
 <insert Table 4 about here> 
The estimated results presented in Table 4 suggest that, in overall terms, the presence 
of foreign firms negatively affects the leverage of both state and collectively owned and 
privately owned domestic firms. As compared to state and collectively owned firms, the 
negative impact on the leverage of privately owned domestic firms is stronger. This result is 
not surprising as most banks in China are state-owned. 
While in overall terms, the impact of leverage on firm capital structure in China’s 
manufacturing sector is negative, this result may not hold across all industries within the 
manufacturing sector. In the rest of this paper, we consider the case of China’s (i) textile 
industry, (ii) transportation equipment industry, (iii) electrical machinery and equipment 
industry and (iv) communication equipment, computer and other electronic equipment 
industry. In relative terms, the textile industry does not rely on advanced technology and, like 
the transportation equipment industry, the textile industry also caters for a high level of 
domestic demand. The last two industries are relatively more export oriented and these 
industries also have a higher level of foreign presence. The estimated results for each of the 
four industries are reported in Tables 5 to 8.  
<insert Tables 5 to 6 about here> 
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Table 5 shows that presence of foreign firms has a negative impact on the leverage of 
textile firms. It is interesting to note that the estimated coefficient is smaller than the one 
reported in Table 3. This suggests that, as compared to the overall impact on the 
manufacturing sector, that presence of foreign firms has a stronger effect on leverage of 
domestic firms in China’s textile industry. Table 6 shows that, in the case of China’s 
transportation equipment industry, the impact of foreign presence on leverage is positive 
which appears to suggest that foreign presence in this industry creates stronger competition in 
the domestic market. The empirical results presented in this paper are based on data collected 
from 2000 to 2007. In recent years there have been some changes in government policies 
concerning foreign investment in China’s transportation sector. The new policies are 
designed to substantially reduce foreign presence in the domestic car industry.  
Table 7 shows that presence of foreign firms has a negative effect on firm leverage in 
China’s electrical machinery and equipment manufacturing industry. In addition, as 
compared to its overall effect on the manufacturing sector, the impact on firm leverage in this 
industry is smaller. However, Table 8 shows that the impact of foreign presence on firm 
leverage in China’s communication equipment, computer and other electronic equipment 
industry is statistically insignificant. It is interesting to note that the negative impact of 
profitability on leverage in this industry is the strongest.  
<insert Tables 7 to 8 about here> 
 In summary, the empirical results presented in this paper suggest that (i) in overall 
terms, foreign presence is an important determinant of firm leverage in China’s 
manufacturing sector and (ii) the impact of foreign presence on firm leverage varies from 
industry to industry. 
 
4.1 Sensitivity analysis 
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The empirical model has been estimated by using three different estimation 
techniques; OLS, Tobit and IV-Tobit and the main conclusions concerning the link between 
foreign presence and firm capital structure highlighted in this paper remain robust to the 
choice of estimation procedure. In addition, we conducted a number of other robustness 
checks.  
First, we dropped the industry dummies (as they may be collinear with the foreign 
presence variable) and re-estimated the model. Second, the presence of foreign investment is 
measured by the number of foreign firms as a proportion of the total (i.e., number of foreign 
plus domestic firms). But in our empirical exercise, we measure foreign presence as the 
proportion of foreign firm assets to the total in the four digit industry classification. In order 
to examine whether this affects our empirical results, we re-estimated equation (8), using the 
proportion of the number of foreign firms in the four digit industry as a measure of foreign 
presence. Third, one could argue that firm size can be better measured by the logarithm of 
firm assets instead of the number of employees and hence we re-estimated the model using 
this variable. Fourth, in our previous empirical exercises, a firm is defined to be foreign firm 
if it receives foreign investment. An alternative definition is that a firm is foreign firm only if 
it is 100 per cent foreign invested19. Using this definition, we re-constructed the measurement 
of foreign investment presence20 and re-estimated equation (8). 
In each of the four cases, our main empirical findings were unaffected. In order to 
save space, these results are not presented in this paper; however we would be happy to 
provide these results to interested readers upon request.  
                                                 
19 We thank the reviewer for pointing this out. 
20 The average foreign presence in a four digit industry with this definition is 14.25 per cent. 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
The existing literature on foreign direct investment, such as the work of Meyer and 
Sinani (2009), suggests that domestic firms in host countries experience positive spillovers 
from the presence of foreign firms. Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2006) and Aghion et al. 
(2009), among others, suggest that, depending on the distance from the world technology 
frontier, entry of foreign firms can reduce the output of domestic firms. In other words, the 
foreign investment related productivity spillover effect can also be negative. A strand of the 
existing literature on capital structure, such as the seminal work of Brander and Lewis (1986), 
suggests that the output and capital structure decisions of firms are interdependent. It can 
therefore be argued that the presence of foreign investment can also affect the firm capital 
structure. However, none of the available studies has explicitly examined the link between 
the presence of foreign investment and firm capital structure.  
By making use of a simple theoretical model where (a) the presence of foreign 
investment results in productivity spillovers to domestic firms that can be non-positive and 
(b) domestic firms select their optimal debt by maximizing their value, this paper shows that 
there is a link between firm capital structure and foreign presence. We show that in the 
presence of positive productivity spillover effects from foreign to domestic firms, there is a 
positive relationship between foreign presence and firm debt. An increase in foreign presence 
also increases the optimal level of investment, as long as the productivity spillover effect is 
positive. In the presence of negative productivity spillovers, an increase in foreign presence 
decreases both debt and investment of domestic firms. As foreign presence can increase (or 
decrease) both debt and investment, its impact on leverage of domestic firms is only clear 
under certain conditions (see Proposition 1).  
We explore the link between foreign presence and firm leverage by making use of 
firm level panel data from China. Based on the theoretical model, an empirical model is 
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specified, which includes foreign presence and a number of control variables as determinants 
of the firm leverage. The empirical model is estimated by using firm level panel data from 
China’s manufacturing sector over the period 2000-2007. The model is estimated for 
domestic firms by means of OLS, Tobit and Instrumental Variable Tobit regressions. The 
empirical model is also estimated after disaggregating firms into (i) state and collectively 
owned and (ii) privately owned domestic firms. As the link between the firm leverage and 
foreign presence can vary across industries within the manufacturing sector, the model is also 
estimated for 4 separate manufacturing industries. The empirical results reported in this paper 
are found to be fairly robust. 
The empirical results presented in this paper suggest that presence of foreign 
investment has a negative and significant effect on the leverage of domestic firms in China’s 
manufacturing sector.21 The presence of a statistically significant relationship between 
leverage and foreign presence validates the theoretical relationship. Not surprisingly, we find 
that the negative impact of foreign presence on the leverage of privately owned domestic 
firms is relatively strong. This could be attributed to the fact that domestic banks in China are 
state-owned and hence they tend to favour state and collectively owned firms. Our empirical 
results suggest that the impact of foreign presence on the leverage of domestic firms in 
China’s textile industry is negative and significant. We also found that the impact on the 
leverage of domestic firms in the textile industry is much stronger compared to its overall 
impact on the manufacturing sector which suggests that, in relative terms, Chinese banks are 
not keen to support the local domestic textile industry. The impact of foreign presence on the 
leverage of domestic firms in the electrical machinery and equipment manufacturing industry 
is negative but smaller than the overall impact on the manufacturing industry. On the other 
                                                 
21 While this paper focuses on the impact of a change in foreign presence on capital structure of domestic firms, 
the entry of domestic firms with foreign firms like characteristics can also result in productivity spillovers to the 
rest of the domestic firms. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for bringing this point to our attention. 
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hand, the impact of foreign presence on the leverage of domestic firms in China’s 
transportation equipment manufacturing industry is positive. The Chinese government is keen 
to protect its domestic automobile industry from foreign competition and, by increasing the 
availability of credit to domestic firms in the transportation industry, the Chinese banks 
appear to be simply following government directions. Finally, we found that the impact of 
foreign presence on the leverage of domestic firms in China’s communication equipment, 
computer and other electronic equipment manufacturing industry is statistically insignificant.  
While this paper deals with the impact of foreign investment on domestic firms in 
China’s manufacturing sector, recent studies, such as Doytch and Uctum (2011), highlight the 
implications of the shift of foreign investment from the manufacturing to the services sector. 
It would be interesting to examine the impact of fluctuations in foreign presence on leverage 
of services sector firms. Due to unavailability of data, we were unable to examine this link in 
China’s services sector. Nevertheless, it is a significant subject for a future research. Besides, 
as mentioned earlier, this paper can also be extended by exploring the entry of domestic firms 
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Table 1: Manufacturing Sector Summary Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean 
Standard. 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Leverage 164118 0.12 0.21 0 1 
ln(firm size) 164216 -1.70 1.09 -4.83 5.09 
Collateral 164216 0.97 0.07 0.07 2 
business risks 164215 1.03 31.04 0.0047 1158.72 
Profitability 164216 0.08 0.21 -1.99 17.38 
NDTS 164216 0.03 0.04 0 1.77 
growth opportunities 143689 0.21 4.75 -1 1210.05 
foreign presence 164216 0.33 0.17 0 1 
Ownership 164216 0.34    
Source: NBS, Beijing, 2000-2007 
Notes: Firm size is measured as the natural log of number of employees in thousands. 
Accordingly, an average firm size of -1.7 implies 0.1826 thousand employees. 
                       Note: NDTS is the non-debt tax shield. Collateral is the collateral value of assets. 
 
Table 2: Correlation Matrix of the Variables (the Manufacturing Sector) 
  
ln(firm 
size) age ownership collateral 
business 





ln(firm size) 1         
age 0.28 1        
ownership -0.16 -0.25 1       
collateral -0.07 -0.04 0.01 1      
business 
risks -0.003 -0.01 -0.01 0.001 1     
profitability -0.07 -0.08 0.08 0.08 -0.002 1    
NDTS 0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.001 0.07 1   
growth 
opportunities 0.0001 -0.01 0.005 -0.0004 0.0003 0.005 -0.01 1  
foreign 
presence -0.06 -0.13 0.10 0.02 -0.004 0.01 -0.02 0.005 1 
Source: NBS, Beijing, 2000-2007 




Table 3: Manufacturing Sector Estimation Results 
  IV Tobit Tobit OLS 







ln(firm size) 0.07*** 0.001 0.07*** 0.002 0.02*** 0.001 
Age 0.003*** 0.0001 0.003*** 0.0002 0.001*** 0.0001 
Ownership -0.03*** 0.002 -0.03*** 0.005 -0.01*** 0.002 
Collateral -0.38*** 0.02 -0.38*** 0.03 -0.15*** 0.02 
business risks -0.00004 0.00004 -0.00005 0.00003 -0.00003** 0.00001 
Profitability -0.10*** 0.01 -0.10*** 0.01 -0.05*** 0.005 
NDTS -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 
growth opportunities -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0001 
foreign presence -0.18*** 0.01 -0.13*** 0.02 -0.05*** 0.01 
industry dummies yes  yes  yes  
year dummies yes  yes  yes  
Constant 0.44*** 0.02 0.43*** 0.03 0.34*** 0.02 
       
Number of obs 143500  143500  143500  
F 12864.61(w) 92.08  58.72  
R-squared n.a.  0.09   0.06   
Note: NDTS is the non-debt tax shield. Collateral is the collateral value of assets. ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively; (w) is the Wald chi2 statistic; The estimated 
value of the Wald statistic for exogeneity of foreign presence is 69.13 with a p-value of 0.000, which 
rejects the null hypothesis of exogeneity of foreign presence. 
 
Table 4: IV Tobit Estimation Results by Ownership within the Manufacturing Sector 
  Privately Owned State and Collectively Owned 
  Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient Standard Error 
ln(firm size) 0.06*** 0.002 0.07*** 0.001 
Age 0.004*** 0.0002 0.003*** 0.0001 
Collateral -0.48*** 0.03 -0.34*** 0.02 
business risks -0.00009 0.00011 -0.00002 0.00004 
Profitability -0.08*** 0.01 -0.11*** 0.01 
NDTS 0.03 0.05 -0.04 0.03 
growth opportunities -0.0045 0.0028 -0.0002 0.0002 
foreign presence -0.23*** 0.02 -0.15*** 0.01 
industry dummies yes  yes  
year dummies yes  yes  
Constant 0.49*** 0.03 0.41*** 0.02 
     
Number of obs 51498  92002  
Wald 2477.59  9145.97  
Note: NDTS is the non-debt tax shield. Collateral is the collateral value of assets. ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively; Both regressions are IV Tobit; The estimated 
value of the Wald statistics for exogeneity of foreign presence is the case of privately owned firms is 
22.83. The corresponding value in the case of state and collectively owned firms is 43.23. In both 







Table 5: Estimation Results for Textile Industry 
  IV Tobit Tobit OLS 







ln(firm size) 0.07*** 0.004 0.08*** 0.008 0.02*** 0.004 
Age 0.003*** 0.0004 0.003*** 0.0006 0.001*** 0.0004 
Ownership -0.08*** 0.010 -0.08*** 0.018 -0.03*** 0.008 
Collateral -0.45*** 0.07 -0.43*** 0.13 -0.19*** 0.07 
business risks 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.02 
Profitability -0.16*** 0.03 -0.16** 0.07 -0.06*** 0.014 
NDTS 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.14 0.08 0.06 
growth opportunities -0.0121 0.0081 -0.0129 0.0085 -0.009*** 0.0031 
foreign presence -0.35*** 0.04 -0.31*** 0.06 -0.12*** 0.03 
year dummies yes  yes  yes  
Constant 0.53*** 0.07 0.50*** 0.13 0.36*** 0.07 
       
Number of obs 10190  10443  10443  
F 1051.4(w)  24.3  17.43  
R-squared n.a.  0.10   0.07   
Note: NDTS is the non-debt tax shield. Collateral is the collateral value of assets. ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively; (w) is the Wald chi2 statistic; The estimated value of 
the Wald statistic for exogeneity of foreign presence is 10.01 with a p-value of 0.002, which rejects the null 
hypothesis of exogeneity of foreign presence. 
 
Table 6: Estimation Results for Transportation Equipment Manufacturing Industry 
  IV Tobit Tobit OLS 







ln(firm size) 0.07*** 0.004 0.07*** 0.007 0.02*** 0.004 
Age 0.003*** 0.0002 0.003*** 0.0004 0.002*** 0.0003 
Ownership 0.01 0.010 0.02 0.018 0.01* 0.008 
Collateral -0.49*** 0.07 -0.50*** 0.10 -0.20*** 0.06 
business risks 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03** 0.02 
Profitability -0.21*** 0.04 -0.19*** 0.06 -0.07*** 0.021 
NDTS -0.25* 0.15 -0.26 0.17 -0.14** 0.07 
growth opportunities -0.0165** 0.0078 -0.02** 0.0087 -0.009*** 0.0030 
foreign presence 0.18*** 0.03 0.16*** 0.05 0.08*** 0.02 
year dummies yes  yes  yes  
Constant 0.34*** 0.07 0.36*** 0.11 0.30*** 0.06 
       
Number of obs 8523  8973  8973  
F 866.47(w)  19.78  12  
R-squared n.a.  0.10   0.06   
Note: NDTS is the non-debt tax shield. Collateral is the collateral value of assets. ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively; (w) is the Wald chi2 statistic. The estimated value of 
the Wald statistic for exogeneity of foreign presence is 0.52 with a p-value of 0.47, which fails to reject the null 




Table 7: Estimation Results for Electrical Machinery and Equipment Manufacturing Industry 
  IV Tobit Tobit OLS 







ln(firm size) 0.06*** 0.004 0.06*** 0.007 0.01*** 0.003 
Age 0.004*** 0.0003 0.004*** 0.0006 0.002*** 0.0003 
Ownership 0.003 0.009 0.004 0.016 0.001 0.006 
Collateral -0.36*** 0.07 -0.36*** 0.12 -0.14** 0.06 
business risks -0.006 0.00678 -0.007 0.00678 -0.001 0.00221 
Profitability -0.29*** 0.04 -0.26*** 0.07 -0.07*** 0.020 
NDTS -0.08 0.11 -0.06 0.15 -0.02 0.05 
growth opportunities 0.0031 0.0065 0.0041 0.0063 -0.0009 0.0027 
foreign presence -0.11*** 0.04 -0.11* 0.05 -0.03 0.02 
year dummies yes  yes  yes  
Constant 0.27*** 0.07 0.26*** 0.12 0.26*** 0.06 
       
Number of obs 9876  10415  10415  
F 661.97(w)  17.05  10.19  
R-squared n.a.  0.07   0.04   
Note: NDTS is the non-debt tax shield. Collateral is the collateral value of assets. ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively; (w) is the Wald chi2 statistic; The estimated value of 
the Wald statistic for exogeneity of foreign presence is 0.03 with a p-value of 0.87, which fails to reject the 
null hypothesis that foreign presence is exogenous. 
 
Table 8: Estimation Results for Communications Equipment, Computers and Other Electronic 
Equipment Manufacturing Industry 
  IV Tobit Tobit OLS 







ln(firm size) 0.06*** 0.006 0.06*** 0.010 0.02*** 0.005 
Age 0.006*** 0.0006 0.005*** 0.0009 0.003*** 0.0006 
Ownership -0.05*** 0.016 -0.06** 0.026 -0.02 0.010 
Collateral -0.77*** 0.13 -0.73*** 0.25 -0.38** 0.17 
business risks 0.006 0.04 0.006 0.04 0.01 0.02 
Profitability -0.36*** 0.07 -0.35*** 0.11 -0.14*** 0.034 
NDTS -0.53** 0.25 -0.52* 0.32 -0.14 0.13 
growth opportunities -0.005 0.0145 -0.02 0.0105 -0.0002*** 0.0000 
foreign presence 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.03 
year dummies yes  yes  yes  
Constant 0.68*** 0.14 0.66** 0.26 0.45*** 0.17 
       
Number of obs 2794  3058  3058  
F 443.21(w)  10.53  8.12  
R-squared n.a.  0.17   0.12   
Note: NDTS is the non-debt tax shield. Collateral is the collateral value of assets. ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively; (w) is the Wald chi2 statistic. The estimated value of 
the Wald statistic for exogeneity of foreign presence is 0.32 with a p-value of 0.57, which fails to reject the null 
hypothesis that foreign presence is exogenous. 
    
 
